args

Resolved: The country of Scotland should legalize gay marriage.

Please note that as of 8:09 A.M., my opponent has not posted any of his sources for the second round. Con Case Justice My opponent has agreed to adopt the standard of Justice for this round, so whoever best upholds Justice should gain your vote. I offered Aristotle's definition of Justice, namely that of "treating equals as equals and unequals and unequals." He first claims that this definition of Justice is poor because it does not provide any threshold as to what being unequal would entail. This really isn't a good argument. At this point in the case, we are debating philosophy, and not law. It is not the purpose of philosophers to define what the law should entail, but rather to grant a set of universal principles that can be applied by politicians to legal decisions. The reason that the treatment isn't defined is that it varies from situation to situation. In the case of hiring, unequals wouldn't be considered for the job (for example, people without medical degrees would not be considered for a job as a physician), and in the case of criminal trials, unequals wouldn't go to jail (noncriminals would not be punished while criminals would). The point is that my definition isn't supposed to provide specific legal standards because it is a universal standard that can be applied to a wide variety of situations. This isn't a reason to reject a philosophical idea. He then claims that this could result in unfair discrimination and would allow any number of atrocities. He cites the examples of blacks, for examples. The reason that this doesn't make sense is that he is ignoring the fact that Justice must be applied holistically, and that the unequal treatment is only for specific scenarios in which there is a significant difference between two groups such that they merit unequal treatment. I'll use his own example to clarify. Blacks have been systematically discriminated against throughout history. It is therefore just to compensate the victims of discrimination. Individuals who have not been discriminated against (whites, for example), don't merit compensation since they are unequal with regards to being discriminated against. This doesn't mean that we can strip whites of all of their right to life, however, just because they are unequal in that one regard. Whites and blacks are humans and thus both deserve to have the right to life. Stripping whites of their right to life in this situation would be unjust because they are equals to blacks in this regard and if we stripped them of their rights, they would be wrongfully treated as unequals. The difference in treatment only extends to the specific situation in which they are unequals; it does not extend to realms in which the groups are equals. Therefore, the standard I provide safeguards against unfair discrimination. Finally, he accepts Justice as the standard but does not provide any alternative definition. He claims to use the Merriam-Webster version, but that was neither posted in his arguments nor was it sourced, and Merriam Webster has seven different definitions of Justice. [1] Since he hasn't provided any clear definition of Justice, we accept my standard. This will have implications that I will explain later. Aristotle and Rawls The Rawls analysis explains that each individual has inviolable dignity that cannot be overridden by social calculations of good, which do not consider what individual is due. My opponent first claims that Rawls and Aristotle have different definitions of justice because Rawls enumerates rights that people have. This is false. Rawls uses the same definition of Justice as Aristotle, and the rights that he enumerates are those rights that people have by virtue of the fact that they are equal. The fact that Rawls has the same definition is evident through his difference principle. According to the difference principle, inequalities in the distribution of goods are fair if those inequalities benefit the worst-off members of society [2]. In other words, the people who are worst off deserve some sort of special consideration, while their unequals, the people who are best off, do not merit this treatment. Rawls is using the same standard as Aristotle; he is treating equals (the worst off) in a different manner than the unequals (the best off). My opponent next claims that Aristotelian ethics are incompatible with Rawls' analysis because Aristotle argues in favor of utilitarianism. I'll first note that I never adopted Aristotle's ethical theory; I simply used his definition of Justice, which is the same standard that Rawls uses. Next, I'll note that this argument is false; Aristotle's version of eudaimonic happiness is completely different from utilitarianism's hedonic happiness. Utilitarianism's hedonic happiness allows for individuals to do as they please in order to maximize happiness in society [3]. Aristotle explicitly rejects this hedonic calculation and instead argues that some means of pursuing happiness, while yielding pleasure, do not promote well-being because they do not promote achieving the human potential [4]. Just feeling good isn't enough to pursue happiness (which is what utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham claim) [4]. In fact, Aristotle would reject homosexuality and non-procreative sex entirely since they don't utilize the sexual organs to their full potential (procreation) and thus submit to base pleasures instead of eudaimonic happiness. The implications of this are twofold. First, Aristotelian ethics do not promote utilitarianism and do not conflict with Rawls' analysis. Second, since my opponent adopts Aristotle's theory in his arguments, and Aristotle would reject non-procreative sex, his philosophical structure is turned entirely and flows Con. He next claims that his definition of Justice permits utilitarianism and that my rejection of util is unfair since other standards permit it. I'll first note that he never specified which of Merriam-Webster's seven definitions of Justice he is using, and some of them reject utilitarianism entirely. We are accepting my standard because he has not provided any other clear definition. Second, my rejection of utilitarianism stems from Rawls' argument that because all individuals are equal, they have basic rights that cannot be stripped away from social calculations that consider social good but not what each individual is due. Util only looks at majoritarian benefit, but not at individual rights. The only conceptions of justice that permit util are those that reject rights entirely, and he cannot use any of those standards because one of the arguments in his case was about civil rights. He has to accept my standard because using any of those other standards would contradict his own case. Observation 1 I demonstrated that the notion of infertile couples is irrelevant since marriage is about actions that are procreative in type and not in effect. He argues that this is a double standard because they are the same in effect. It really isn't a double standard because marriages are about actions that are procreative in type and not in effect. What makes an act procreative in type is the nature of the act itself, and not any external factors which may be imposed on it [5]. Gay sex is not procreative in type while heterosexual sex is; the infertility of one of the partners is an external factor that is being imposed [5]. If it really bothers my opponent, however, I'm willing to argue that infertile marriages should not be recognized by the state as well. Syllogism The following premises of my syllogism were conceded: 1, 3, and 6. He rejects premise 4 on the basis that granting gay marriages licenses does not detract from the special social value of heterosexual marriage in any way. (The question of who assigns the value is nonsensical because it is obviously the government. That was made very clear throughout the debate.) The problem is that premise 3 explains why this is the case. Premise 3 (which was entirely conceded by my opponent) notes that What has special value to human society deserves special social recognition and sanction. Granting gay marriages the same recognition as heterosexual marriages (which do have special social value as noted by the conceded premise 1) would be a denial of the special social value of heterosexual marriages since they would not be receiving the special social recognition and sanction that they merit as per premise 3; rather, they would be receiving the same recognition as the gay marriages which do not deserve that recognition. He next attacks premise 2 by claiming that gay couples can reproduce. This is false. Gay couples cannot reproduce with each other; rather, they use heterosexual unions to reproduce. As premise 1 notes, heterosexual union is still the indispensable means through which life (which is a precondition to society) begins, even for gay couples. His argument holds no water. He rejects premise 5 on the basis that it's incompatible with my definition of justice. This doesn't even make sense. The point of the syllogism is to prove that homosexual marriage and heterosexual marriage are unequals and thus merit unequal treatment. The equal marriages (heterosexual) are being treated one way; the unequal marriages (gay) are being treated another. This fits the definition. Pro Case In response to his claim about civil rights, I noted that as long as the state does not interfere with private gay marriage, failing to recognize such marriages is not a violation of rights because rights are negative. He claims that because marriage is formed and regulated by government, if the state does not grant licenses, it is banning it. This is utterly false. First, marriages were not created by the state; rather, they predate the state and human society altogether [6]. Second, he's confusing recognition with regulation. The state is not regulating marriage because it is not granting specific groups special licenses to conduct marriage ceremonies and it is not forcing people to go through specific ceremonies in order to be regarded as privately married. All of these aspects are regulated by private individuals. The only thing that the state does is grant recognition to heterosexual marriages; it does nothing else. If the state were regulating marriage, it would be dictating who can privately marry whom and would be forcibly breaking up private marriages that it disagreed with. This isn't the case in Scotland; governmental recognition of one's relationship is not a precondition to being privately married. I used his own definition of second class citizen to disprove his claim that gays are second class citizens. He has now shifted his claim to the idea that they are "closer" to being second class citizens. The fact of the matter is that by his own definition, they are not second class citizens, so no violation is taking place. There is no standard for being "close" to a second class citizen; either someone is a second class citizen or someone is not. He's just being vague to cover the fact that his own definition disagrees with his argument. He next concedes that since the provisions against same sex marriage also apply to heterosexuals, the state is not technically discriminating against gays, but the then claims that since only gays would want to marry gays, they are being discriminated against. It doesn't matter if gays are the only people who want to marry gays; the standard applies to all people regardless of sexual orientation. His argument is similar to claiming that prohibitions against pedophilia are discriminatory because only pedophiles want to engage in such behavior. This doesn't make any sense because the standard is applying to all people regardless of their desires. Discrimination implies unequal treatment, and the treatment here is completely equal. He next claims that Aristotle's justification of happiness would promote gay marriage, so utilitarian calculations should be considered. I've already explained why 1. Aristotle opposes utilitarianism and 2. He opposes homosexual and non-procreative sex. His theory isn't about increasing hedonic happiness; it is about achieving eudaimonic happiness. This response holds no water and I also turn the structure of his case. He next says that there is no incentive for gays to get privately married. This doesn't make sense. The value of marriage stems entirely from the love and commitment one has to one's partner, and not from a piece of paper that someone else gives you claiming that he recognizes your marriage. If gays really love each other, they have plenty of incentive to get privately married. In response to his Prop 8 study, I claimed that the reason that gays felt stress was that they came under increased scrutiny and attack. He says that his study examines all such amendments. His response is nonresponsive. Gays came under increasing scrutiny and attacks when all of those amendments were being issued, meaning that this explains the stress in all cases. He finally reiterates his point about defending my conception of justice. Note that he didn't provide any definition, so mine must be used. Sources http://www.merriam-webster.com...