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Pascal's Wager Gives a Sound Argument That One Should Believe in God

Error in Category Pascal was a deeply skeptical man. He lived in the 17th century, which rejected the medieval age's confidence as to the possibility for reason to reach knowledge of God. We cannot understand the argument apart from this context.(1) Pascal did not believe it was possible to prove God, and so he centered his efforts on proving that belief in God remains the most rational position. His is not an argument for the existence of God, but exactly what this debate proposes: a sound, practical argument that one should believe in God. Pascal does not, therefore, aim his argument at those who believe there are arguments which cast doubts upon the existence of God. In saying that God is unknowable he is saying his is also unfalsifiable. To Pascal, God only makes himself intelligible through the Incarnation, and even then only to those who are seeking him. As professor David Wetsel puts it: "(...) hardened skeptics fail to penetrate the (...) veil of Revelation. In Pascal's scheme of things (...) [those who seek God] have already been touched by Grace." It is to these who seek without yet having found to whom Pascal directs his Wager, and to apply the logic to others would be to misapply it. His is not a universal argument, but one tailored to a very specific audience. To say it unsound because it does not do what it did not seek to do would be irrational. Reformulating Pascal's Wager Peter Kreeft, professor of philosophy at Boston College, defends Pascal's wager by re-formulating it. He sets forward three scenarios: 1. A person you love is dying and a cure is offered to you at a small cost. You do not know whether the drug actually works. ¿Would it not be reasonable to try it? 2. You are told your house is on fire with your children in it. Would it not be reasonable to run (or at least call) home even without asking for further evidence? 3. There are two lottery tickets left, one being the winning ticket. Would it not be reasonable to spend a dollar "on the good chance of winning a million"? Pascal argues that belief in God is one such case. We have no way of rationally proving or disproving the claims that come to us through Revelation, and yet the potential gain is so high if one accedes, and the potential loss so great if one refuses, that it would be irrational not to believe in God. Belief and the Will Con's intellectualist objection seems to be a strong one. Indeed, it is among the few that Pascal addresses directly in his own exposition of the wager in his Pensées.(4) Pascal asks his hypothetical objector to act as if they did believe. To "fake it till they make it" if you will. Once it is accepted that the safest bet when arguments for and against are inconclusive is belief in God, it would be irrational not to take it, then it is no longer a matter of reason that prevents belief but "human passions", as Pascal puts it. Intellectualists would say that this is besides the point, as one cannot force oneself into belief. This, however, is counter factual and, as the Latin adage would say: contra facta non valent argumenta. The fact is that many people do this very thing. Pascal had experience of it in his own day (he tells objectors to "learn of those who were bound and gagged like you, and who now stake all they possess") and we have numerous examples today, not only in the realm of religion but also of politics. Anthropologist Carol J.C. Maxwell, in her book Pro-Life Activists in America(5), explores the "process of conviction" and sets forth the idea that beliefs many time follow actions, and active involvement with a cause may not be so much the result of conviction as its cause. This is a topic increasingly studied by behavioral psychologists, sociologists and others besides anthropologists and goes beyond the scope of this debate. Suffice to say that intellectualists have to face reality before they can formulate a coherent objection against Pascal. Objections: Besides those we have already explored, my opponent offers two objections. One, based on what he regards as a false dichotomy, and the other on probability. False dichotomy: "The first option [belief in God] is in reality merely a compartmentalization of many more options, believing in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism(...)." Pascal is not making an argument for those who are between Budhism and Shinto or between Animism and Islam. Pascal is speaking specifically to those who are trying to make sense of Christian Revelation and yet have reservations as to the existence of God because they regard it as unproven. Comparative religion is interesting in its own right, and would make for a fine debate, but it is not the debate that Pascal was engaging in. Whether or not it applies to every person in every situation may affect the validity and soundness of a general proof of the existence of God, it is hardly relevant to what is a pragmatic argument in favor of a specific group of people accepting belief in God. Con's contention certainly proves it is not universal, it does very little to prove that it is unsound. Probability A, Unknowability: "When dealing with a deity that we can admittedly know nothing for certain about beyond its definition, to assume that this deity rewards believers is absurd." We have already seen that Pascal regarded God as unknowable to unaided reason, but knowable through Revelation to those who seek Him. This is not an abstract argument, but one which has Christian Revelation as a starting point. First come arguments in favor or against the validity of Revelation, where Pascal would reject such religions as were known at the time (fundamentally Islam and Judaism). Once Christian revelation has proved unfalsified if unsupported he goes on to the wager. Remember, as we have said before, we are not addressing a universal argument, such as Aquinas' five ways. I may prefer the latter being a Thomist, but I would be cautious before saying that this makes it unsound. A practical argument directed to particular people need not address the concerns of those it is not directed towards in order to be considered sound. Probability B, Self-Contradiction: Given our definition of God (...) there are some contradictions in the basic nature of this entity that reduce the probability of His existence to zero Most of Con's contradictions are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of God, and base themselves on the idea of one quality limiting and therefore negating another. Things such as the paradox of the stone which have God creating something which limit himself may be fun as playful musings, but they make for bad philosophy. Not everything that we can say in a sentence is logically possible. It is not weakness for God not to be able to draw a square circle or create a married bachelor or make a kilt out of happiness. It is simply a foolish thing to ask. It is not a strength for God to be illogical, and it is not a contradiction for Him not to oblige. The problem of evil, of course, has had debates of its own on this site. It is probably the only cogent argument against God's existence that has ever been formulated. It would, however, be enough to refute it to posit that there is a "sufficient moral reason", as William Lane Craig puts it, for God to allow evil. As long as it is even possible that such a reason exist, there is no longer an essential contradiction. In any case, Pascal's argument is directed specifically at those who have already sifted through arguments like these and found them wanting. It is further directed at those who have already sifted through the arguments for God's existence and found them wanting. The argument starts from the premise of the unfalsifiability of God and is directed solely at those who accept this premise. In the case that the premise is true, Pascal's wager is sound. Back to you, Con. Sources: (1) http://bit.ly... (2) http://bit.ly... (3) http://bit.ly... (4) http://bit.ly... (5) http://bit.ly...